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A friend once said to me that he would be glad to discuss postmodernity if only he knew what modernity 
meant. There are so many descriptions. We're all modern: Modern society, modern art, modern 
philosophy, modern science, modern technologies. The reformation, the wars of religion,  the American 
revolution, the French revolution, the Paris Commune, the world wars. Civil society, capitalism, the 
liberal state, the procedural state. Luther, Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Manet, Cezanne, Rawls, 
Warhol. But also Novalis, Nietzsche, Heidegger and the German cultural conservatives. Derrida, Bataille, 
Levinas, Pynchon. And so forth.
Here is Robert Pippin's enumeration of what he sees as the common features of modern societies: 
The new conception of nature required by modern science; the post-Cartesian notion of 
mind as subjective consciousness; a political world of passion-driven but rationally 
calculating individuals, or a 'post-Protestant' world of individually self-reliant, 
responsible agents; a new political language of rights and equality; and, most of all, a 
common hope: that a secular, rational basis for moral and political order could be found 
and safely relied on, could inspire the allegiance and commitment necessary for the 
vitality and reproduction of a society." (I 2)1
Hegel had his own theory of modern life and thought, centering around the culmination of spirit's 
teleology in objective and absolute spirit, based on the logical patterns of the movement of spirit's 
development. Modern times brought decisive liberations and completions, but also permanent tensions, 
and a loss of immediate rootedness in a natural or social home. Modern selves are strong enough to be bei 
sich in the midst of modern tensions and negativities, but it takes work and maturity to deal with the 
inner complexities of modern thought and the built-in tensions of modern institutions.
However, despite all the inner tensions he described, Hegel disagreed with theorists who saw modernity 
as the achievement of a divided reflective self. He wanted to move beyond ironic awareness, utilitarian 
calculations, and the romantic and reflective divisions characterized by the categories of essence. Irony 
and reflection were to find their place within a new immediacy of modern structures and institutions. The 
term "immediacy" is too strong for what Hegel is proposing, but I use it to stress how for him permanent 
tensions and dialectical dualities and the work of the negative do lead to relatively stable modern 
structures of self and society. Even though they contain much inner tension, they do not imply permanent 
revolution.
But permanent revolution is just what many would argue should be distinctive of modernity. If Hegel 
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should be thought as somewhat non-modern, this would be in his belief that there are structures of 
movement and institutional frameworks that are not themselves open to revision. There are the categories 
of the logic, there is the final religion, there is the state with its institutions, its puzzling agricultural class, 
and its national spirits. This offends those devoted to eternal reflection and ongoing contestation. They 
dismiss Hegel, or, if they are sensibly Hegelian, they make his recommendations more general, remove 
these details, and revise him into a proponent of endless progress.
Yet Hegel reasserts the state above the dynamism and freedom of civil society. In Hegel's description of 
civil society the parameters that open the space of social possibilities are set by arbitrary will (contract), 
brute nature (physical needs), and social contingency (the indefinite multiplication of needs in the 
market). The space of possibilities so constituted has little internal shape and allows almost unlimited 
circulation and substitution. For Hegel the space of social possibilities must allow individuals and groups 
to achieve a social identity that is integrated into a structured whole of social possibility, rather than 
sliding around in the shifting circulation of civil society.  The unity of the state must be expressed in 
institutions and functional divisions that connect with the concrete rationality of intersubjective 
community rather than with the formal rationality of the market. The moments of universality, 
particularity, and individuality must be mediated through structures that open the distances and 
articulations that make social life possible. 
These days Rawls and many others argue that a decisive modern invention is the liberal procedural state 
that allows its citizens their own autonomy and their own multiple conceptions of the good. Local 
institutions should be set up as if chosen by autonomous modern citizens in accord with procedural 
meta-institutions. But for Hegel, to claim that modernity gives us meta-institutions for generating 
detailed local institutions would be to claim that a species of formal universality was enough. We know 
that Hegel's state does more than supervise procedures. His views on the role of public opinion differ 
from standard liberalism, his Estates are not a normal liberal legislature, his agricultural class is to live in 
immediate unity with the values of the national spirit. Today's religious and nationalist fundamentalisms 
may react against modernity, but might Hegel might agree with them that there is a problem with 
modern formal identity.
All readings of Hegel agree that our awareness of the workings of the modern world is part of that 
working. But not all readings would agree about the place of particularity in that work. 
From his early writings on Hegel worries about modern dichotomies. He encompasses modern splits 
within a movement that enfolds within itself any attempt to establish a position beyond or outside itself. 
He is not unique in this strategy; besides Hegelians, we find related moves in Nietzsche, in Heidegger's 
step back and its hermeneutic successors, in deconstruction, in Habermas' dialogic rationality, and in 
pragmatists such as Rorty. Among that group, Hegel demands the most, since he wants that enfolding 
overarching movement to imply more definite particularity.
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The abstract issues here concern the status of formality (formal syllogisms, formal judgments, formal 
analyses, formal processes). Are there further conditions of possibility for form/content distinctions? Or 
is some kind of form/content distinction the ultimate intellectual gesture? Is some set of procedural 
moves, accompanied by contingent content, the ultimate political move? Is a formal self-consciousness of 
ourselves as criticizers and innovators of structures our ultimate modern home? Or are all of these located 
within a movement that cannot be described in terms of form and content?
Many readers of Hegel today, and many other theorists of modernity, would argue that formality has the 
first and last modern word.2 In Max Weber's terms, to be modern is to have made the move away from 
substantive rationality and ways of life that depend on comprehensive cosmic doctrines. Whether you 
then agree with Weber that modern formal rationality is instrumental rationality writ large, or with 
Habermas that modern rationality has other richer dimensions, you are still accepting that to be modern 
is to move to a formally defined identity. Of course there must be contingent content, but what makes 
your identity modern is your awareness of the difference between form and content, and your 
manipulation of the content within the formal features of subjectivity and community.
Hegel stands with Heidegger and deconstruction in denying the ultimacy of the form/content division. I 
take Hegel as asserting that formal processes or distinctions are only possible within some fuller motion 
that cannot be described in those (Verstand) dualities, and that our full modern identity involves a self-
awareness of being in that motion that is more than distinguishing a form from content.
Consider interpretations of Hegel as a partisan of unending open contestation. Robert Pippin's 
interpretation of Hegel and modernity is more complex and nuanced than the formal openness I will be 
considering, but his statements can be used to evoke a class of readings of Hegel. Pippin rejects the details 
of Hegel's grand narratives:
It is unlikely that so much, from the exhaustion of Greek tragedy, to the paradoxes of 
Roman law on property, to Leibniz's failed monadology, can be linked to a developing 
self-consciousness about the very possibility of "positions" or "theories" or 
philosophy . . . . 
Instead, Pippin sees Hegel as promising
a kind of unending contestation about any fixed points or settled results, a modernity 
necessarily unending and unsettled. (I 414) 
Using the language of the logic of essence, Pippin says that 
Truly determinate reflection is not a resolution of the opposition between positing and 
external reflection, but a continuation of such a constantly unstable reflective enterprise 
in a suitably self-conscious (and so, in a speculative sense, satisfied) way." (H 257) 
[The logic provides] an absolute comprehension of the nature of the incompleteness of 
thought's determination of itself, of the necessity for reflectively determined Notions, and 
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yet the instability and ultimate inadequacy of those Notions. (H 257)
These statement are emblematic of readings of Hegel that interpret the dialectical process as ongoing self-
criticism and self-creation.3
I would like to argue that such readings over-emphasize the logic of essence, and that they reduce 
modernity to a matter of formal universality, and keep Hegel too much on a meta-level. That is what I 
would like to argue, but the case is not so clear. Such readings of Hegel are not just Heideggerian or 
postmodern celebrations of the lack of mediating structure in modern society. These readings of Hegel 
insist that spirit must find itself in some objective structures and patterns of mutual recognition, and that 
typically modern institutions are needed for full self-consciousness. They affirm that the creation of new 
mediating structures happens through something like a dialectical process. Pippin rejects the notion of 
determinate negation, but he insists that structures are constantly compared with an ideal of full self-
consciousness. This gives direction to the process, even if it does not provide necessity for any given 
transition.
Hegel argues that for modernity certain definite mediations and structures are necessary. He also insists 
that such structures be explicitly posited (in the logic, in social institutions, in art works) rather than 
merely acknowledged in a private reflective grasp. This second issue is the key to the first, as it is the 
requirement for explicit positing of spirit's moments that establishes the particularity of the structures.
The divine idea is just this: to disclose itself, to posit this other outside itself and to take it 
back again into itself, in order to be subjectivity and spirit. (E §247z)  
The Concept is the ground and source of all finite determinateness and manifoldness. 
(WL 12.22 / 2.227 / SL 589) 
Spirit is not . . . an essence that is already  finished and complete before its 
manifestation . . .  but an essence which is truly actual only through the specific forms of 
its necessary self-manifestation. (E §78z)
Spirit comes to itself through the positing of particular structures. 
Since it contains all determinateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself 
through its self-determination or particularization, it has various shapes, and the 
business of philosophy is to cognize it in these. (WL 12.236 / 2.484 / SL 825)
How far does that self-determination go? We are familiar with the embarrassments caused by Hegel's 
willingness to descend far into the realm of the particular.4 For instance, in discussing geological 
stratification and the arrangement of the continents, he claims that 
The general law of this sequence of formations can be recognized without any reference 
to the historical aspect; that is the essential point--this is the rational element which alone 
has interest for the Notion: to recognize in this sequence the characteristics of the 
Notion. . . .  [The arrangement of the continents] appears at first to be accidental; but the 
activity of the Notion is to grasp as necessarily determined what to sense-consciousness 
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appears as contingent. Contingency  certainly has its place too, but only in 
unessentials. . . . The Old World exhibits the perfect diremption into three parts, one of 
which, Africa, the compact metal, the lunar principle, is rigid through heat, a land where 
man's inner life is dull and torpid--the inarticulate spirit which as not wakened into 
consciousness; the second part is Asia, characterized by Bacchanalian extravagance and 
cometary eccentricity, the centre of unrestrained spontaneous production, formlessly 
generative and unable to become master of its centre. But the third part, Europe, forms 
the consciousness, the rational part, of the earth, the balance of rivers and valleys and 
mountains--whose centre is Germany. The division of the world into continents is 
therefore not contingent, not a convenience; on the contrary, the differences are essential.  
(E §339z2)
Faced with such implausible claims about the details of nature, it is tempting to defend Hegel by 
retreating to a more general level. For instance, we might disdain his argument about the continents, but 
still admit that certain very large divisions of nature do need to be thought as conceptually necessary. Or 
we might say that we find the details of his proposed state legislature unconvincing and unnecessary, but 
that he has rightly shown the necessity for a mediation of the aspects of society that the legislature is 
supposed to unite, though various kinds of legislatures could accomplish that mediation.
Hegel is surely not deducing Krug's pen. But to see the issue as a dispute over the degree of generality or 
formality appropriate to Hegel's conclusions misses the main issue. That issue is not what level of formal 
self-definition modernity entails. The issue is formality itself. The dichotomy of form and content is the 
wrong way to talk about Hegel's encompassing motion of thought. That motion is self-conceived in the 
absolute idea, as it is spelled out in third part of the logic, where the idea's structure and movement 
appears in the mediations of judgment and syllogism, universal, particular, and individual.
Hegel would argue that the absolute idea conceives a space or space-ing or motion that cannot be 
described in terms of a form/content distinction, and within which that distinction arises. The question 
then becomes how determinate and how self-consciously particular must the moments of that motion be? 
For it might seem that the absolute idea itself could be just a higher level formal analysis.
Consider a parallel from Hegel's aesthetics. Hegel sees romantic art as going beyond the divisions of form 
and content, inner and outer, that were so harmoniously balanced in classical art. However, this is not 
because romantic art achieves a new higher level of form. Rather, the motion of romantic spirit can no 
longer be described in form/content terms. The romantic cathedral abandons the classical temple's clear 
form and offers instead a bewildering multiplicity of detail and decoration in a complex divided space 
within a solid shell that seems intent on both showing its weight and dematerializing itself. The 
experience of the cathedral puts us within a motion inward and upward that cannot be fully embodied in 
frozen matter because it is a motion away from the outerness of matter, a motion that cannot be described 
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as a form/content distinction because it poses and moves over and through such distinctions. With the 
awareness of that motion the balanced dichotomies of classical art now appear as a lovely moment of 
stasis within a process that those dichotomies can neither describe nor explain.
But the resolved dualities of the classical were not the first form of art. The classical must be preceded by 
the imbalances of symbolic art. First there had to be posited abstract or isolated versions of those 
moments that will be united in classical art. So there were first the excesses of symbolic art, where form 
and content, inner and outer, failed to come together; symbolic art asserts the independence of each 
component, while classical art unites them by being their more concrete mediation. Then classical art's 
balances will themselves turn out to be abstract and isolated moments within the fuller motion of 
romantic art. These moments must first be posited in their separation and their abstractness so that they 
can be picked up into the motion of the spiritual totality. 
[Classical art's] appropriate content is the spiritual individuality which, by being the 
content and form of what is absolutely true, can appear in consciousness only after 
complex mediations and transitions. The beginning is, as a beginning, always abstract 
and indeterminate. But spiritual individuality must be concrete in and for itself. It is the 
adequate actualization of the Concept that determines itself out of itself, which can be 
grasped only after it has sent ahead [presupposed,vorausgeschikt], into their one-sided 
development the abstract aspects whose mediation it is. Once this happens, the Concept 
makes an end of these abstractions together by its own appearance as a totality.5
Hegel says that in romantic art, God is not the perfect Greek statue in the central temple balancing infinite 
and finite. Rather, the romantic God is the very movement between the finite and the infinite (Gott als 
dieser Wechsel (A 13.119)). God is not form, nor content, God is their exchange and mediation. That is what 
modern self-consciousness should be. The process is self-present only by being the mediation of its own 
already posited incomplete and abstract moments.
The same principle applies in nature, in the historical stages of spirit's formation, and in contemporary 
politics where the concrete totality is achieved by mediating the posited abstract or isolated versions of 
the constitutive moments. These are not arbitrarily contingent content, nor Heideggerian facticity; they 
are the necessary moments deren Vermittlung is the concrete whole. 
Hegel's Begriff is not a Spinozistic substance with infinite attributes. Its content is restricted, because its 
content is its own necessary mediations. Spirit comes to be through bringing together its own motions 
posited abstractly and incompletely. The positing of these particular moments, motions, and mediations 
is the birth -- and the holding open -- of the space of reasons and of mutual recognition, and through that 
movement that space comes already inherently structured. 
Hegel is willing to use form/content language to talk about the absolute idea, but he turns that language 
on itself when he insists that the content is the progression of the moments of the form. "The logical idea 
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has itself as the infinite form for its content"6 
The manifestation of itself to itself is therefore itself the content of spirit and not, as it 
were, only a form externally added to the content; consequently spirit, by its 
manifestation, does not manifest a content different from its form, but manifests its form 
which expresses the entire content of spirit, namely, its self-manifestation.   (E §383z)7 
The relation of the movement of spirit to its particular determinations is not that of external form to 
content, nor quite that of universal to particulars; it is the relation of the absolute idea to the earlier 
categories in the logic, and then the relation of the logic to the Realphilosophie. Philosophy does more than 
oppose necessary form to contingent content.
In contrast to the empirical sciences . . . speculative thinking has to demonstrate each of 
its objects and the explication of them, in their absolute necessity. This is effected by 
deriving each particular concept from the self-originating and self-actualizing universal 
concept, or the logical idea. Philosophy must therefore comprehend spirit as a necessary 
development of the eternal idea and must let the science of spirit, as constituted by its 
particular parts, unfold itself entirely from its Concept. (E §379z) 
Over and over Hegel makes the same point. The process is the revelation of itself, but not of itself as 
formless energy or formal meta-position. For example, when Hegel disparages the physics of his day he 
makes a criticism similar to his his argument for the state as a more concrete universal than civil society.
The inadequacy of the thought-determinations used in physics can be traced to two 
points which are closely bound up with each other. (a) The universal of physics is 
abstract or only formal; its determination is not immanent in it and it does not pass over 
into particularity. (b) The determinate content falls for that very reason outside the 
universal; and so is split into fragments, into parts which are isolated and detached from 
each other, devoid of any necessary connection, and it is just this which stamps it as only 
finite. (E §246z) 
I have been arguing that for Hegel modern spirit posits and conclusively mediates determinate moments 
in its coming to itself. Its moments are the large defining movements of the system: in itself, for itself, in 
and for itself; being, essence, concept; universal, particular, and individual. These are elaborated in the 
doctrine of judgment and syllogism, and then self-reflected in the discussion of method in the absolute 
idea. They may seem quite general, but they are involuted into one another and repeated fractally on 
different scales to provide more determinate content that is the manifestation of spirit's form, which is its 
process of coming to itself, which is its self-manifestation.These moments must first be posited in their 
separated or abstract, form, and then mediated into a whole in which they find their proper place, so 
Hegel's modern spirit is not, as Pippin would have it, "a kind of unending contestation about any fixed 
points or settled results, a modernity necessarily unending and unsettled." (I 414)8
Hegel does, then, challenge some current ideas about modernity. For him, self-creation and self-assertion, 
and spontaneity and autonomy, all involve the explicit positing and mediation of determinate moments, 
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not a formless creativity facing brute fact. That process needs procedural institutions, but it also needs 
immediate values that involve the explicit expressions of the process's built-in moments, divisions, and 
tensions. Those immediate values and partial identities are embodied in contingent ways, but it is not 
contingent what moments they are. This argues against the reduction of everything to reflection, and 
against both a conservative flight to fixed natural values and an easy postmodern irony.
If we were to accept this teaching, it would have implications about the relation of modern institutions to 
groups and institutions that do not accept liberal values. Hegel defines a modern "we" that transcends 
particularistic identities without being just formally universal. He would see current religious or ethnic 
particularist identities not as external elements or anti-modern reactions, but as isolated moments of the 
modern process of self-affirmation. His awkward descriptions of the national spirits of various European 
peoples show his concern that these identities embody defined aspects of spirit's process. He would urge 
that today's groups be mediated out of their isolated absoluteness, but not melted down to some least 
common identity.9 If Rawls's criteria for political liberalism were used to question his neutrality, Hegel 
would argue that his reasons lie not in some particular cosmological view but in the conditions that make 
possible any view at all.
There is much that we could gain from considering Hegel's views on these matters. But there would be a 
price to pay. Can we accept that the particular determinations of social groupings and functions are so 
necessarily determined?10  Hegel's descriptions of the to-be-mediated others imperialistically assign to 
them what their self-understanding must already be.
I have been arguing that for Hegel the particularity within modernity comes from the determinacy of the 
logical movements of the system as they involute upon one another. But we may not be quite so sure 
about the severe necessity of the logical progression.11 Does what Hegel says about mediating structures 
depend on an untenably strict view of the necessity of determinate negation? Without strong determinate 
negation generating a firm list of moments to be posited, would modernity be reduced to a formal 
process facing brute givens?
I do not think that is quite where we would end up, for we could still hold to Hegel's insight that there is 
no formally defined activity that can be posited a such. The underlying issue concerns the conditions of 
the possibility of formalism. My own preference would be to agree with Hegel that form/content 
distinctions happen within an overarching motion that allows no distinctions except within itself, and 
that cannot itself be analyzed using form/content distinctions. But, disagreeing with Hegel, such a 
motion can be self-referential without closure or self-transparency. 
Can we find ourselves within a motion that enfolds and originates dichotomies, especially the form/
content dichotomy, yet without being able to provide a definitive logical analysis of that motion? The 
motion would be indirectly known and invoked, but not presented. Modern formal analyses and formal 
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1 Robert Pippin,Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
institutions would be within a movement that posits them as not the whole story, finds itself in exceeding 
them, in exposing them, but does this in a way that reveals as well its own impurities. 
This line of thought argues with Hegel about transparent self-return. We could modify Hegel's insight 
that the form of the motion becomes its own content, because the overarching process does not have a 
proper form. This claim shares argumentative terrain with Pippin and others but lacks the self-sure 
formality of their interpretations. Instead it moves closer to deconstruction and hermeneutics, and so into 
debates with Heidegger, with Derrida, and with Ricoeur.
Hegelian echoes are cheerfully invoked in hermeneutics and grudgingly admitted in poststructuralism. 
Like Hegel, the poststructuralist invokes an overarching motion that is not analyzable in form/content 
terms. Hegel's positing and then mediating of abstract partial identities turns into the necessary 
projection of excessive unity -- necessary after the manner of Kant's necessary illusions of reason -- 
followed by a deconstruction of those unities. Some poststructuralists eager for social analysis then rush 
to identify these moments with particular social groups, hierarchies, or avant gardes. The impatient 
poststructuralist should conclude, however, that the overarching process that is the condition of visibility 
cannot itself be made visible or invoked as a political player, though it can be indicated by a gesture not 
unlike Hegel's refusal to see partial moments as final wholes. 
Lacking Hegel's definitive list of necessary moments, we would still find our own factical mediations 
through a hermeneutics, suspicious or not, of current institutions. This would, I think, lead to a version of 
Hegel's discussion of the relations of civil society and state. Knowing how to be modern would be 
knowing how to live with and in these structures and processes while not identifying with any one of 
them, even those more formal and free. This is close to Hegel's positing them as moments, except without 
a self-transparent rational totality.12
Would this imply a challenge to the claim that modernity is unsurpassable? If the argument that 
modernity is the final shape of spirit depended on the purity of the self-return involved, and if that purity 
were questioned, then modernity would be reduced to one among many possible stories and historical 
forms. But I would argue that the purity and formalism of modern self-consciousness are not the essential 
marks of modernity. The defining modern stance is a self-awareness of the overarching process within 
which stories and historical forms appear. Purity and formalism are one mode of that self-awareness, 
though, oddly enough, a mode that is not yet sufficiently purified of certain traditional dichotomies. Still, 
there is a distinctive modern stance from which any reimposition of fixed ultimate dichotomies would be 
a regression and not just a change13.
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Press, 1997), hereafter referred to as "I". Abbreviated references will also be made to Pippin's Hegel's 
Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
referred to as "H", and to Hegel's Encyclopedia ("E" followed by section number) and his larger Logic 
("WL" followed by page references to the Gesammelte Werke, vol. 12 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1981), to the 
Philosophische Bibliotek edition of the second volume of the Wissenschaft der Logik , vol 2 (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1963), and to the Miller translation (Hegel's Science of Logic (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), 
indicated by "SL".
2 In this essay I emphasize theories of modernity that stress its formal processes and 
institutions. There is a related approach that is often found in the same thinkers, stressing the 
differentiation and independence of spheres of thought and value. Hegel also relates ambivalently to 
those theories. He would agree that modern art and politics have won their freedom from 
comprehensive cosmological doctrines, and that modern thought cannot be drawn from a substantive 
doctrine of nature. The normative must be separated from the natural, as pure thought must be 
separated from images. However because of the self-generation of pure thought, the various spheres 
do not go their own way. Or, rather, their differing ways are all opened by the same logical 
progression, embodied and further determined differently.
3 Pippin insists that as an outcome of our history there must be a self-reflectively legitimated 
rational process of self-orienting. This is more than formal self-consciousness facing factical givens. 
That is how the process of development starts, but as it goes along current practices are found 
insufficient by their own implied criteria. Differing from Hegel, Pippin argues that these failures 
motivate but do not define replacement practices. The new is justified because retrospectively it 
redoes the old better, but what it redoes becomes defined more and more in terms of autonomy. The 
failures of practices and social arrangements to meet their own goals are all due to built-in 
frustrations of or lack of acknowledgment of the autonomy of conceptual construction. Through the 
failures of local projects, it gradually becomes clear that there is really only one fundamental project, 
autonomy. Then that purer project can be taken up self-consciously as our goal, which happens in 
modern institutions and self-consciousness. In explicating this, Pippin combines Nietzschean and 
Kantian themes: "The ultimate Hegelian claim is that the problem of self-definition or identity is a 
problem of social power, not metaphysical truth, and that this process has a certain "logic" to it. (I 424) 
"There is no . . . external point of view, and so 'we,' ourselves inheritors and products of such self-
transformations, must understand how such institutions and practices have come to assess 
themselves, what sort of reassurance they have achieved, how satisfying they have turned out to be, 
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how they have led to 'us.'" (I 336) We justify our practice by a historical account combined with the 
demonstration that the changes occurring in that history were rationally acceptable replacements for 
what was wrong with prior formations. The story of that process will reveal that the "basic failures 
are always due to the denial of . . . conceptual autonomy." (I 172)
4 Hegel makes similar claims about the logical basis of developments in the histories of religion 
and philosophy: "The Bible is for Christians the basis . . . which strikes a chord within them, and gives 
firmness to their convictions. . . . . But just as soon as religion is no longer simply the reading and 
repetition of passages, as soon as what is called . . . interpretation begins . . . . certain presuppositions 
are made with regard to this content, and . . . everything depends on whether this content  is true. . . . 
[The content] can only be forms that are genuine and logically developed in terms of necessity. But 
the investigation of these forms of thought falls to philosophy alone."  (Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. by Peter Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 399-402). "Nach dieser 
Idee behaupte ich nun, dass die Aufeinanderfolge der Systeme der Philosophie in der Geschichte 
dieselbe ist, als die Aufeinanderfolge in der logische Ableitung der Begriffsbestimmungen der 
Idee." (Berliner Niederschrift 1820, in Einleitung in der Geschichte der Philosophie; (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1940), 34).
5 This passage is from Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), vol. 
13, 411. The translation is modified from T. M. Knox's Hegel's Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 
vol. 1, 317).
6 "The logical idea has itself as the infinite form for its content -- the form which constitutes the 
opposite to content to the extent that the content is the form-determination withdrawn into itself and 
sublated into identity in such a manner that this concrete identity stands opposed to the identity 
developed as form. The content has the shape of an other and a given as against the form which as 
such stands simply in relation, and whose determinateness is at the same time posited as appearance. 
More exactly, the absolute idea itself has for its content merely this, that the form determination is its 
own fulfilled totality, the pure concept. The determinateness of the Idea and the entire course 
followed by this determinateness is the object of the science of logic, from which course the absolute 
idea itself has emerged for itself. It has shown itself for itself that determinateness does not have the 
shape of a content, but exists wholly as form, and that accordingly the Idea is the absolutely universal 
idea." (WL 12.236 / 2.485 / SL 825)
7 The entire passage reads: "The manifestation of itself to itself is therefore itself the content of 
spirit and not, as it were, only a form externally added to the content; consequently spirit, by its 
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manifestation, does not manifest a content different from its form, but manifests its form which 
expresses the entire content of spirit, namely, its self-manifestation. In spirit, therefore, form and 
content are identical with each other. Admittedly, manifestation is usually thought of as an empty 
form to which must still be added a content from elsewhere; and by content is understood a being-
within-self which remains within itself, and by form, on the other hand, the external mode of the 
relation of the content to something else. But in speculative logic it is demonstrated that, in truth, the 
content is not merely something which is and remains within itself, but something which 
spontaneously enters into relation with something else; just as, conversely, in truth, the form must be 
grasped not merely as something dependent on and external to the content, but rather as that which 
makes the content into a content, into a being-within-self, into something distinct from something 
else. The true content contains, therefore, form within itself, and the true form is its own content. But 
we have to know spirit as this true content and as this true form." (E §383z)
8 A less dialectically determined particularity in Spirit's motion might be suggested by Hegel's 
comment that "Spirit endures contradiction because it knows that it contains no determination that it 
has not posited itself, and consequently that it cannot in turn get rid of. This power over every 
content present in it forms the basis of the freedom of spirit. . . .  actual freedom does not therefore 
belong to spirit in its immediacy but has to be brought into being by spirit's own activity. It is thus as 
the creator of its freedom that we have to consider spirit in philosophy. The entire development of the 
concept of spirit represents only spirit's freeing of itself from all its existential forms which do not 
accord with its concept; a liberation which is brought about by the transformation of these forms into 
an actuality perfectly adequate to the concept of spirit." (E §382z) However, the way spirit frees itself 
from inadequate forms is not by an act of sovereign Sartrean creativity, but by the process described 
in the Phenomenology and the Logic. 
9 Hegel's refusal to melt down all identities is evident from his carefully legitimated divisions 
within the state, and from his worries about the effects of enduring interest groups upon the 
legitimacy of democratic governments. His strong emphasis on patriotism and religion are meant to 
counterbalance the plurality of interests and identities that will continue within the rational state. 
10 The writings of Richard Winfield show how one might try to answer this question in the 
affirmative.
11 The necessity of determinate negation has problems even within Hegel's text, not just because 
the details seem to go too far. See my Critique of Pure Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986). 
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12 To decide between a hermeneutic Hegelianism and a modest poststructuralism would 
involve arguments about the role of rational judgment. Roughly speaking, the former would find 
rational judging as a factor within the process of hermeneutic appropriation and extension, while the 
latter would take rational schemes as products of the process. In either case, it might seem that 
lacking either Hegel's assured list of particular moments, or Pippin's relatively self-transparent goal 
of rationality, a move away from formal modernism would end in a facile relativism. It is true that in 
a more hermeneutical mode the imperative of increasing self-awareness of the process does not on its 
own provide usable criteria. But it is never on its own. There are always factical spaces of alternatives 
and directions and suggestions about ways to go on. Logical space is more Aristotelian than 
Newtonian. A parallel might be drawn with values such as simplicity in decisions among rival 
scientific theories. Stated formally, simplicity provides no usable criterion since there are indefinitely 
many ways in which simplicity might be measured. But some of those ways are already salient, 
schematizing the formal criterion. That salience is itself changeable, but again there will always be a 
factical set of axes already in play guiding such change, though, again, those can be changed in 
similar fashion. In all these changes, on whatever level, there are factical guides and the possibility of 
changing them, but there is no final court of appeal or formally defined platform which gives the 
definitive schematization of the relevant values.
13 It is a separate issue to what degree such self-awareness is found only in recent times. In 
several essays in Postmodern Sophistications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). I argue that 
the awareness is not so restricted, though its institutionalization as central to modes of mutual 
recognition is new to modernity.
